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Abstract 
The analytical research from agency theory suggests that an output- 
based compensation can have effort effects and self-selection effects. 
This study extended Banker et al.'s recent study to a multi-output 
setting and investigated those two effects in an insurance firm using 
individual monthly sales data  for multiple products a s  well a s  
employment history data. We have demonstrated that these two effects 
exist under  a mult i-output  setting. The resul ts  showed tha t  
compensation scheme changes could induce sales mix changes by the 
effort reallocation process. In addition sales performance of remaining 
employees is better aligned with the new compensation scheme that 
t ha t  of employees who had quit  support ing the  self-selection 
hypothesis. 
I. Introduction 
Productivity gains are  perceived as providing long-term 
competitive advantages, p,articularly for firms operating in 
mature industries.Many companies have initiated new workforce 
strategies to motivate employees to focus on productivity 
improvements. A program that has recently been implemented 
a t  many firms involves the  use  of output-based incentive 
compensation plans. Such programs link compensation to 
measured performance for employees at various levels, not just 
for those a t  the top (Schlesinger and Heskett, 1991). 
* This research is supported by the Suam Education and Culture Foundation. 
A fundamental question in management accounting is how 
compensation contracts  affect worker and  organizational 
performance. Two main problems considered in compensation 
contracts are moral hazard and adverse selection. The moral 
hazard problem arises when agents have no incentive to expend 
high levels of effort. Because a performance-based contract 
provides incentives for the agent to increase his effort for higher 
reward, agency theory and sales force compensation literature 
suggest that, compared to a flat salary, a performance-based 
cont rac t  improves a n  agen t ' s  performance (Basu ,  Lal, 
Srinivasan, and Staelin, 1985). In addition to moral hazard 
effects, performance-based contracts offered in a labor market 
may induce more productive workers to select a firm that offers 
performance-based contracts.Both of these factors are expected 
to increase overall productivity (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). 
Although previous research provides empirical evidence on the 
impact of an  incentive contract (Wagner, Rubin, and Callahan, 
1998; Banker, Lee, and Potter, 1996), formal evidence has been 
lacking about which of these two factors leads to a n  overall 
increase in productivity.In a recent paper, Banker, Lee, Potter 
and  Srinivasan (1997) provided empirical evidence on the  
adverse selection and moral hazard effects of performance 
compensation by examining the individual productivity of sales 
consul tants  in retail s tores.  While Banker,  e t  a l . ' s  paper 
examined changes in overall sales level after the adoption of 
output-based compensation, this paper investigates the impact 
of changes in output-based compensation schemes on the sales 
mix under a multi-output setting. 
The research site of this paper is a n  insurance firm whose 
sales force sells various insurance products. The sample firm 
adopted a new incentive plan that  emphasized a particular 
insurance product. According to the moral hazard hypothesis, 
we could expect an  increase in sales of- that particular product, 
resulting in a change in the sales mix.Empirica1 results of this 
study supported the above prediction and showed that after a 
compensation scheme change, the sales proportion of that  
particular product had significantly increased. 
If the adverse selection effect exists, then we should be able to 
observe that remaining employees are better aligned with the 
new compensation scheme than quitting employees. The results 
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of this study showed that the sales performance of remaining 
employee group with respect to the particular product was better 
than that of quitting employee group. Although, in the short 
term, temporary workers showed a quick adjustment to the new 
compensation scheme, long term results provided evidence that 
productivity of remaining employees increases over time. 
This study is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the 
research site and the compensation plan for the sample firm. 
Section 3 develops hypotheses based on the study. Section 4 
presents research models to test these hypotheses. Empirical 
results are discussed in Section 5. Concluding remarks with 
qualifications are offered in the final section. 
11. Research Site and Compensation Plan 
Our research site is an  actual life insurance company in Korea 
(labeled 'Eternlife') with a sales force of approximately 6,500 and 
1,500 administrative personnel. The company's 6,500 personnel 
are located in 400 sales branches throughout the country. While 
sales branches are spread over a large geographic area, most 
branches are located in or near an  urban area. The manager of 
each branch is assigned from company headquarters, and there 
are 10-30 sales representatives in each of the sales branches. 
Sales branches are regrouped into several sales divisions. 
The product sold by various branches is the same among all 
branches. The two main categories of insurance products of 
Eternlife are 'savings type' product (SAP) and 'protection type' 
product (PRO). SAP earns interest while PRO serves a traditional 
insurance function. Historically the research site promoted the 
sales of SAP because the positive interest margin (interest 
revenue minus interest expense) was sizable as long as industry 
was regulated. Recent deregulation of the financial industry, 
however, has narrowed this margin significantly and decreased 
the attractiveness of SAP. Consequently, the company h a s  
changed the emphasis in its marketing strategy from SAP to 
PRO. To facili tate t h i s  change ,  t h e  firm adopted new 
performance scoring system, which gave more weight to PRO. 
A high turnover rate within the sales force and a relatively flat 
sales organization are  typical characteristics of insurance 
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Table 1. Performance Scoring Weight Changes on October 1, 1993 
- --- 
Product Types I Before the Change I After the Change 
companies. Sales representatives usually receive a commission 
on sales amounts of various products plus a modest base salary. 
Therefore output-based commission comprises the bulk of sales 
force compensation. 
One of the main sales incentive strategies for insurance 
companies is to change the performance scoring system for 
supervisors (branch heads) and their frontline sales forces. 
Performance scores will determine the performance rating and 
corresponding opera t ing expense  budge t  available for 
superv i sors ,  as well a s  moneta ry  compensat ion (direct  
compensation) for the sales force. Supervisors will then use this 
allocated operating budget to maximize their branch's sales 
performance scores ,  which will de te rmine  the i r  f u t u r e  
compensation, especially non-monetary rewards s u c h  as 
promotion. 
Table 1 shows the change in the performance scoring system 
targeted for supervisors, which occurred on October 1, 1993. We 
can observe that the scoring weights of SAP were significantly 
lowered from 100% to 15-80%. Conversely, higher scoring 




111. Hypotheses Development 
Agency theory requires that the principal choose the incentive 
contract which maximizes his or her own expected utility after 
taking into consideration the agent's utility-maximizing behavior. 
Once a compensation contract is given, agents will allocate their 
effort to maximize their utility. Chow (1983) and Waller and 
Chow (1985) provided evidence on the self-selection and effort 
effects of incentive compensation contracts in a controlled 
environment.Some empirical work reported on the factors that 
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and Weitz, 1989; Coughlan and Narashimhan, 1992). The intent 
of this paper is not to test the optimality of the compensation 
contract but  to examine the effect of the exogenously given 
incentive contract on the performance and self-selection of 
employees. 
Agency theory is one paradigm that suggests that performance- 
based compensation has value. Examples of agency theoretic 
models for examining sales force compensation include Basu, 
Lal, Srinivasan and Staelin (1985), Lal, and Staelin (1986), and 
Rao (1990). In a typical agency framework, a principal designs a 
contract to motivate a risk- and effort-averse agent to exert 
unobservable effort in a production process that is characterized 
by uncertainty. The principal receives the  residual after 
compensating the agent.In this formulation, the optimal contract 
bases compensation for the agent on observed output, which the 
principal uses as an indicator of the effort expended by the agent. 
One of the problems considered in contract design is moral 
hazard which manifests itself when agents have an incentive not 
to exeit high levels of effort. Because a performance-based 
compensation contract provides incentives for the agent to 
trade-off the cost of increased effort for a higher reward, agency 
theory and sales force compensation literature suggest that, 
compared to a straight salary, a performance-based contract 
improves agents' performance (Basu, Lal, Srinivasan, and 
Staelin, 1985). 
Despite all these predictions from agency theory, empirical 
evidence on the impact of output-based compensation on 
productivity are quite limited (Banker et al., 1996). In fact, some 
research provides contradicting evidence. The study by Pearce, 
Stevenson, and Perry (1985) investigated the impact of output- 
based incentive schemes on performance a n d  found no 
significant change in productivity. Similarly, Hogarth, et al. 
(1991) claim that compensation does not necessarily increase 
performance. Behavioral research in  the  management  
accounting area (Awasthi and Pratt, 1990) shows that monetary 
compensation is not linked to productivity improvement. This 
paper will provide field-based evidence on the effect of output- 
based compensation. 
At our research site, compensation for the frontline sales force 
is mostly based on monetary compensation. This is because 
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other incentives such as promotion are rather unusual in a 
relatively flat sales force organization with a n  extremely high 
tu rnover  ra te .  Individual s a l e s  performance i s  a major  
determinant of sales force compensation. If a particular product 
is given more weight in a new scoring method, this will induce 
the sales force to exert more effort on the sales of that product 
a n d  t h e  sa l e s  mix will change  accordingly af ter  t h e  
implementation of the new incentive contract. 
Hypothesis 1: If a new compensation scheme gives more 
weight to a particular product, then the sales proportion of 
that product will increase and a change in sales mix will occur 
accordingly (moral hazard and effort effect hypothesis). 
Contract in a n  incomplete market setting brings adverse 
selection problem. Adverse selection becomes an  issue in labor 
contracting when workers' skill levels are  not observable. 
Although moral hazard and adverse selection usually seem quite 
distinct, it can be difficult to determine which i s  a t  work 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). The adverse selection literature 
suggests that compared to a flat salary contract, a n  output- 
based incentive contract will attract skilled workers (Demski and 
Feltham, 1978). 
While a n  output-based incentive system had already been 
adopted a t  the research site, a new incentive contract placed 
more weight on PRO. If adverse selection effect works, employees 
who are better skilled a t  selling newly emphasized products will 
remain a t  the firm while less-skilled employees will depart.The 
issue is not the sales level change in general but the sales mix 
change. To test this self-selection effect, we set up the following 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: If a new compensation scheme gives more 
weight to a particular product, then remaining employees will 
sell a higher proportion of t h a t  product  t h a n  qui t t ing 
employees did (adverse selection or self selection hypothesis). 
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IV. Research Design 
The sample data used are individual monthly sales data for 
SAP and PRO over the period from January 1992 to June  1997. 
The research site changed the compensation scheme for its 
frontline sales force on October 1, 1993. 
Unlike the researchers' data set used in Banker et al. (1996), 
we were able to obtain sales data for the period prior to the 
implementation of the plan. This made it possible to compare 
the performance after the compensation scheme changed. 
To examine the adverse selection and moral hazard impact of 
compensation changes under a multi-output setting, we used 
sales mix rather than absolute sales amount as a dependent 
variable (Ahn and Lee, 1998). A sales mix variable is preferable 
to a n  absolute sales  variable not only because sa les  mix 
represents the results of effort reallocation, but  also because 
other  influences s u c h  as economic cycles c a n  be  bet ter  
controlled. To find out the relative performance of different 
employee groups,  we included absolute sales  level as a n  
additional dependent variable. We defined the  dependent  
variables in this analysis as follows: 
PRATIO,,: Ratio of the m-th monthly PRO sales to total sales 
for the i-th employee. 
We classified the sales force into one of the following three 
types: 
TEMP: Sales employees who left the research site within 9 
months after the implementation (6/30/1993) of the output- 
based compensation program. 
QUIT: Sales employees who left the research site after the 
implementation date but prior to the end of the sample period 
(6/30/ 1997). 
STAY: Sales employees who remained through the end of 
the sample period (6/30/ 1997). 
To examine the impact of the compensation changes, we 
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constructed the  variable POSTMON which measures the  
employment period in months after the compensation changes. If 
there exists effort effect (Hypothesis l), we can expect the sales 
force to reallocate their effort following the announcement of the 
new compensation scheme. Then the coefficient of the POSTMON 
will be positive. The variable PREMON measures the employment 
period in months prior to the compensation changes. These 
variables are also used by Banker et al. (1996A). 
To investigate adverse selection and moral hazard impacts, we 
performed the following regressions using ordinary least square 
(OLS) estimation methods. While equation 1 uses an intercept 
shift model, equation 2 uses a slope shift model. 
According to the second hypothesis, we expect the coefficients 
of DT and @ to be negative. Negative coefficients of DT and @ 
imply that the performance of STAY group is greater than those 
of DT and D? 
To examine the difference in performance before and after a 
compensation scheme change, we included the POSTMON and 
PREMON variables in the regression model. If an  effort effect 
exists, we may then expect the coefficient of POSTMON to be 
greater than that of PREMON. 
DT: 1 for TEMP, 0 otherwise. 
D? 1 for QUIT, 0 otherwise. 
POSTMONim: Employment period in months after the change. 
Event Date 
Figure 1. Event Date and Cut-off Dates for Employee Classification 
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PREMONi,: Employment period in months before the change. 
V. Results and Analyses 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive information for the sales force at 
the research site. The table shows that there were 4,324 front- 
line sales personnel a t  the research site during the sample 
period. A comparison of the number of observations (72,858) 
with the number of sales personnel (4,324) indicates that there 
are, on average, about seventeen months of observations for 
each individual. 
Most of the sales force consists of temporary workers (62.5%), 
and about 37% of the sales force is classified as QUIT because 
they left the research site during the sample period (36.8%). The 
proportion of remaining workers (STAY) is only 0.7% of the sales 
force. However, the number of observations for STAY workers 
represents about 2.4% of the total observations. 
Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables 
by sales force types. The mean sales proportion of PRO to total 
sales (PRATIO) is 39.1%. The absolute amount of monthly PRO 
sales (PSALE) and monthly total sales (TOTSALE) have the mean 
of 110,747 Won and 486,077 Won respectively. The average 
employment period for all subjects  is only 18.5 months ,  
suggesting a high turnover rate a t  the research site. 
This  table reports  t h a t  t he  PRATIO for STAY (group of 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics by Sales Force Types 
TOTAL 
8.279 























































11.262 7.946 18.551 13.689 0 
Table 3. Sales Force Composition 
remaining workers) is greater than that either for QUIT (group of 
workers who left) or TEMP (group of temporary workers) over the 
sample period. 
Sales force 1 Sales force-months 
---- Group 1 Number 1 P e r c e n t V i ~ 7 -  
Percent(%) 
-- 
QUIT 1,590 36.8 44,545 61.1 
5.2. Regression Results 
STAY 31 0.7 
TEMP 2,703 62.5 
Total , I 4,324 
Table 4 presents the estimation results for equations 1 and 2. 
As expected, the coefficients of POSTMON (y) are positive and 
statist ically significant in  both equations.  These resu l t s  
demonstrate that the relative ratio of PRO increased over time 
af ter  t h e  compensat ion changes .  We c a n  conclude t h a t  
compensation changes, which gave more weight on PRO, have 
increased the sales ratio of PRO over time through the effort 
reallocation process, strongly supporting the hypothesis 1. 
The coefficients of @ and D~ indicate how the quitted workers 
or temporary workers performed in comparison to the remaining 
workers.Because of adverse selection effects, the signs of and 
PT are expected to be negative. The regression results show that 
the coefficients of p-9 are negative in both equations, although 
significant only in equation 2. This result implies that  the 
performance of QUIT workers is not well aligned with the new 
marketing strategy of the firm which focuses on the sales of 
PRO. 
Unexpectedly, however, the  coefficient values for PT are  
significantly negativein both equations. One explanation is that 
TEMP workers with less than 9 months of employment might be 
able to adjust their effort allocation more easily than STAY and 
QUIT workers because TEMP workers' absolute sales level is 
lower than for STAY workers. Moreover, unlike STAY, TEMP 
might be able to allocate their efforts mostly to new customer 
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***: significant at 1% level*": significant at 5% level 
existing customer base is relatively small. 
To find out the relative performance of TEMP and STAY, we 
used absolute sales level as an  alternative to the sales mix. Note 
that since commissions are calculated based on absolute sales 
and the commission rate for each insurance product, absolute 
sales levels as well as sales mix are major determinants of 
compensation. 
Expected Sign 
5.3. Revised Regression Results 
The following regression equations 3 and 4 replace PRATIO 
(the ratio of PRO sales) with PSALE (the absolute level of PRO 
sales) as a dependent variable. While the coefficients for PT were 
found to be positive in equations 1 and 2, they are negative in 
equations 3 and 4. Despite the large increase in sales proportion 
of PRO, temporary workers showed a relatively smaller increase 
in sales amount than remaining employees. Although temporary 
workers were able to adjust their sales-mixes rather quickly 
resulting in a higher PRATIO than other types of workers, they 
showed relatively low performance in terms of sales level. A fast 
response in terms of sales-mix changes might be due to this 
relatively small base amount. We can conclude that the new 
incentive plan successfully weakened the adverse selection 
problem in an  incomplete market setting (Demski and Feltham, 
1978). This conclusion supports our hypothesis 2. 
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The coefficients for y and 6 are found to be positive. Because 
the dependent variable is the absolute sales level of PRO, length 
of experience should help the performance of sales employees 
whether it is before the change or after the change. Note, 
however, that the coefficients for y are significantly greater than 
those for 6. This implies that the length of experience after the 
change had a greater impact on the sales of PRO than the length 
of experience before the change. This result is consistent with 
the previous result obtained in equations 1 and 2. All of our 
results support the first hypothesis that the sales force will 
reallocate their efforts to maximize their commission when given 
a new compensation scheme. 
5.4. Sensitivity Analyses 
If a worker remained until the end of the sample period (June 
30, 1997), will take the value of 1. We can change the cut-off 
date used in classification of STAY and TEMP. If we select 
February 28, 1997 as the cut-off date, then QUIT will be the 
employees who quit before March 1, 1997 but stayed after June 
30, 1993. Note that for the following regression model 5 and 6 
are based only on sample data after the compensation changes, 
therefore, the PREMON variable does not appear in the 
equations 5 and 6. 








Equation 3 Equation 4 
Expected 1- i n t e r c e F V &  shift 
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Table 6 shows the composition of employee groups using four 
different cut-off dates. For example, when the cut-off date is 
April 30, 1996, the STAY group represents about 21% of the 
QUIT group. . 
Table 7 shows the sensitivity analysis results of four different 
cutoff dates. As the cutoff date moves away from the event date 
(October 1, 1993), the coefficient for PT decreases monotonically 
from 0.161 to 0.089 in equation 5, and from 0.017 to 0.014 in 
June 1997 
Table 6. Composition of Sales Force 
Table 7. Comparison of Regression Results between Sales Ratio and 
Sales Level 








































***: significant at 0.01 level, **: 0.05 level, *: 0.10 level 
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equation 6. A similar trend can be observed in the coefficients of 
PQ, which shows a monotonic decrease from 0.026 to -0.050 for 
equation 51 and from -0.001 to -0.004 for equation 6. These 
shifts strongly indicate that the further away from the event date 
the cutoff date is, the lower the productivity increase for @ in 
comparison to D ~ .  These results support the hypothesis that 
compensation changes at the research site were able to reduce 
the adverse selection problem gradually over time. 
V. Conclusion 
The ana1,ytical research from agency theory suggests that an  
output-based contract offered in a labor market can affect 
performance by at t ract ing workers with certain personal 
attributes to the company (self selection effects). An output- 
based contract can also affect performance by motivating better 
effort from workers (effort effect). Although there has been much 
analytical (and experimental research about these two effects, 
formal empirical evidence is very rare. The recent study of 
Banker et al. (1996) provided empirical evidence on these two 
effects under  a single ou tpu t  sett ing. This paper reports  
empirical evidence of these effects under a multi-output setting. 
Our research is based upon the individual monthly sales data 
for the insurance sales force. After the adoption of the new 
compensation scheme, relative sales of the newly emphasized 
product increased, supporting the effort effect hypothesis. The 
results also supported the self selection hypothesis. Although, 
temporary workers seemed to show a quick adjustment to the 
new comp~ensation scheme in the  shor t  t e rm,  sensitivity 
analyses provided evidence that the productivity of remaining 
employees increases over time. 
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